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Abstract—Crosschain communications allows information to
be communicated between blockchains. Consensus, in the context
of crosschain communications, relates to how participants are
able to agree on the state of one blockchain and communicate
that information to another blockchain such that the information
is trusted. This chapter reviews the usage scenarios of crosschain
communications: value transfer and atomic swaps, reading,
writing, and state pinning. It analyses what attributes must
be maintained for permissionless and permissioned blockchains
using a crosschain consensus mechanism such that the properties
of each blockchain are not compromised. Finally, this chap-
ter reviews the main categories of crosschain communications
techniques: Hash Time Locked Contracts, block header relaying
(BTC Relay, Pegged Sidechains and Ion), relay chains (Polkadot
and Cosmos), and coordination chains with threshold schemes
(Atomic Crosschain Transaction).
I. INTRODUCTION
Crosschain Communications [1] refers to the transferring
of information between one or more blockchains. Crosschain
Communications is motivated by two requirements common in
distributed systems: accessing data and accessing functionality
which is available in other systems. The first requirement, ac-
cessing data in other systems, has been previously achieved by
use of distributed query languages, for example SPARQL Fed-
erated Query 1.1 [2] and the Resource Description Framework
1.1 [3]. The second requirement, accessing functionality in
other systems, has been achieved by use of Remote Procedure
Calls (RPC) [4].
Whereas previous distributed systems have operated with
implicit trust, blockchain systems operate in partially trusted
or untrusted environments. That is, consumers of distributed
query language results issue queries to single servers and
implicitly trust the results. The results are trusted by virtue of
the fact that the results were returned by the server. Similarly,
entities issuing remote procedure calls assume that if the
system the call is issued to indicates the call has executed, then
it has. Additionally, systems that execute remote procedure
calls often execute the calls based on little or no authentication.
Blockchain systems are designed to be Byzantine fault
tolerant. This means that the system can tolerate node failures,
network failures, and malicious actors. Rather than relying on
a single entity, blockchain system nodes come to consensus
on the validity of proposed transactions. In the context of
Crosschain Communications, this means that cross-blockchain
systems need to be Byzantine fault tolerant, and not rely on
single parties for trust.
The properties of liveness and safety are as core to cross-
chain consensus as they are to other consensus protocols.
Fig. 1. Transferring Ether between Ethereum MainNet and a Private
Blockchain.
Communications must only result in known outcomes and
the system must be able to continue to operate, regardless
of system failures, network failures or active adversaries.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sec-
tions. Section II Scenarios describes the usage scenarios that
crosschain communications is used in. Section. III Required
Attributes explains the core aspects of Permissionless and
Permissioned Blockchains that need to be maintained for the
Crosschain Communications technique to be useful in those
environments. The Techniques section, Section IV, lists the
main crosschain communications methodologies and explains
how implementations of those technologies work, which sce-
narios they are able to cater for, whether they meet the require-
ments of Permissionless or Permissioned Blockchains, and
analyses the liveness and safety properties of each technique.
The chapter closes with a comparison of the Crosschain Com-
munications techniques and their related consensus properties
in Section V.
II. SCENARIOS
At a high level Crosschain Communications can be viewed
as reading and writing between blockchains. This section
reviews the scenarios in which this reading and writing occurs.
A. Value Transfer and Atomic Swaps
Users may have value on one blockchain and wish to move
the value to another blockchain. For example, as shown in
Fig. 1, a user may wish to move Ether from Ethereum MainNet
to a private Ethereum blockchain, and then at a later point
move the Ether back to Ethereum MainNet. While the Ether
is on the Private Blockchain the Ether should not be accessible
on Ethereum MainNet. Similarly, once the Ether has been
transferred to Ethereum MainNet the Ether should not be
accessible on the Private Blockchain.
Value transfer could be of the native currency of a
blockchain such as Ether for Ethereum MainNet or Bitcoins
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2Fig. 2. Atomic Swap between two blockchains.
Fig. 3. Reading Values Across Blockchains.
for the Bitcoin blockchain. Alternatively, the value transfer
could be for fungible tokens such as ERC 20 tokens [5], [6]
or for non-fungible tokens such as ERC 721 tokens [7] which
are represented as allocations within Ethereum smart contracts.
A common way to effect a value transfer is to do an
Atomic Swap. In Fig. 2 Alice and Bob have accounts on both
Blockchain A and B. Alice has three coins on Blockchain A.
Bob has two coins on Blockchain B. Alice is prepared to swap
her coins on Blockchain A for Bob’s coins on Blockchain B.
In an Atomic Swap, the coins are switched between Alice and
Bob simultaneously. Importantly, if the transfer fails on either
Blockchain A or B, then the transfer on the other blockchain
fails too.
Value transfers between blockchains are typically Atomic
Swaps in which the value on the first blockchain is moved
such that it is inaccessible. In this situation, the value on the
second blockchain needs to only be created if the value on the
first blockchain can be proven to be inaccessible.
B. Function Calls that Return Values (Reading Data)
Blockchain systems allow the reading of values from the
distributed ledger at a certain block height from a blockchain
node’s local copy of the distributed ledger. This functionality
is typically provided by functions that process the data in the
ledger without updating it, and then return a result. As all
of the computation occurs on the one node and the node is
implicitly trusted by the application calling it, no consensus
between nodes is required prior to returning the value. The
nodes return values upon which the nodes in the blockchain
have previously come to consensus on.
In a crosschain scenario, a node on a blockchain must
convince other nodes on the blockchain that the value from
Fig. 4. Transaction Signalling.
another blockchain is correct. For example, consider the two
blockchains in Fig 3. Imagine that there is an application
that executes a transaction on Blockchain A which includes
a function call to return a value from Blockchain B. The
application starts the transaction on Node E1A. Node E1A
communicates with Node E1B, which may also communicate
with nodes on Blockchain B, to return a value. Node E1A must
then convince nodes Node E3A and Node E5A that the value
returned from Blockchain B can be trusted and used as an
input to the transaction to be executed on Blockchain A.
Reading values from one blockchain to another blockchain
may require both consensus of nodes of the blockchain the
value is being read from and consensus on the blockchain
using the value read, for example Blockchain A.
A scenario similar to reading values across blockchains, but
with reduced requirements is Transaction Signalling. Users
may wish to indicate that a transaction has occurred on a
blockchain to an application on another blockchain. Fig 4
shows two blockchains. Transaction Tx1 is included in block
number two on Blockchain A. A user may wish to signal to
a smart contract on Blockchain B that the transaction Tx1
has occurred. They may use this as a way of validating that
some action should occur on Blockchain B, as a result of
the transaction Tx1 occurring on Blockchain A. Users of
Blockchain B need to have some degree of certainty that the
signalling can be trusted.
C. Transaction Function Calls (Writing Data)
Blockchain systems allow distributed ledger values to be
updated via transactions. Applications submit signed transac-
tions to a node in the blockchain. Nodes gossip the trans-
action to other nodes and may propose a block containing
the transaction. Nodes on the blockchain form consensus on
which block should be added to the end of the blockchain.
In this way, information is written to a blockchain system’s
distributed ledger.
In a crosschain system, an application may wish to submit a
transaction which calls out to another blockchain. For example,
in Fig 3 an application could submit a transaction to Node E1A.
The node could then submit the nested transaction to Node
E1B. In this scenario, some form of consensus is required for
Blockchain A to be sure that the nested transaction has been
submitted to Blockchain B.
Atomic crosschain transactions are transactions in which
there is certainty that the updates across blockchains occurs
together. That is, in Fig 3, the transactions and associated
3Fig. 5. Pinning state of private blockchain onto Ethereum MainNet.
updates are either committed on both blockchains or are
discarded on both blockchains. In this way, the data across
blockchains is guaranteed to have a consistent state.
D. State Pinning
State Pinning [8] is defined as including the state of one
blockchain in another blockchain. For example, in Fig. 5
the Block Hash of a Private Blockchain is put into a Smart
Contract on Ethereum MainNet. As the Block Hash from
the Private Blockchain is included in Ethereum MainNet at
a particular block number, it indicates that the state of the
Private Blockchain can be represented by that Block Hash at
that time. The Block Hash of a block is known as a “Pin”.
A majority of participants of the Private Blockchain could
collude to alter the historical state of the chain [9]. For
example, in Fig. 5, the colluding participants could produce
new blocks 4, 5, and 6 on the Private Blockchain. State
Pinning allows minority participants of the chain to prove to
governmental regulators and others that the state of the chain
has been altered, by showing that the correct state matches the
pinned Block Hash. That is, the minority participants could
demonstrate the valid state of the blockchain at block 5 and
the Pin which has been included in Ethereum MainNet block
1003.
When the state of a private blockchain is pinned it is
important to maintain the privacy of the blockchain by not
revealing the participants of the blockchain, “Participant Pri-
vacy”, or the blockchain block or transaction rate, “Block
Transaction Rate Privacy”. Not disclosing the transaction rate
of a private blockchain is important as attackers may be able
to infer activity based on this. “Anonymous State Pinning”
hides the transaction rate of the pinned private blockchain and
hides the identities of the participants, except in exceptional
circumstances.
E. Final State Pinning
A specialised use of Pinning is to store the final state of a
Private Blockchain prior to the blockchain being archived. Pin-
ning the final state of a blockchain prior to archiving allows the
blockchain to be reinstated later if needed at a state which can
be verified. For example, in Fig. 6, the Private Blockchain’s
late block, block 5, is pinned to Ethereum MainNet prior to
the blockchain being archived. If at a later date the Private
Blockchain needs to be reinstated, the reinstated state can
be shown to be correct by comparing the block hash of the
reinstated state with the pinned value.
Fig. 6. Pinning state of private blockchain onto Ethereum MainNet.
III. REQUIRED ATTRIBUTES
Different types of blockchains and blockchain deployments
have different requirements for a crosschain communications
system. That is, in order to meet the goals of the blockchain
deployment, the crosschain communications system may have
specific requirements or limitations to meet such that they do
not compromise the goals of the blockchain system that they
are part of.
A. Permissionless Blockchains
Permissionless Blockchains are blockchains that allow any
node to join the network of nodes. Any account can submit
a transaction on any node to the blockchain. Permissionless
Blockchains are commonly called Public Blockchains or Pub-
lic Permissionless Blockchains. Examples of Public Permis-
sionless Blockchains are Bitcoin and Ethereum MainNet.
B. Permissioned Blockchains
Permissioned Blockchains typically restrict the nodes that
can join the network to only authorised nodes. Additionally,
Permissioned Blockchains may restrict which accounts are au-
thorised to submit transactions. Permissioned Blockchains are
commonly called Private Permissioned Blockchains, Private
Blockchains or Consortium Blockchains. Examples of Permis-
sioned Blockchains are blockchains that can be established
by Enterprise Ethereum[10] platforms such at Hyperledger
Besu or Quorum, or other private blockchains platforms such
Hyperledger Fabric.
Permissioned Blockchains may allow any node to join
the network, but restrict the nodes that transactions can be
submitted on. This type of network is typically known as a
Public Permissioned Blockchain.
C. Blockchain Attributes
Permissioned Blockchains[10] need to keep the list of
participating nodes private. They need to keep the contents
of transactions confidential. They need to keep the rate of
transactions private.
Permissionless Blockchains do not have any central con-
trol or small number of controlling nodes. Permissioned
Blockchains are often between a small number of participants,
and as such, by virtue of the small number of participants have
some level of centralisation. Some Permissioned Blockchains,
such as Hyperledger Fabric and Corda have centralisation
points [11][12][13]. Hence, crosschain systems typically need
4Fig. 7. Hash Time Lock Contract Set-up.
to have no centralisation points if they are to be used with Per-
missionless Blockchains, whereas some level of centralisation
may be acceptable for Permissioned Blockchains.
Crosschain consensus protocols, similar to other consen-
sus protocols, need a methodology to encourage good be-
haviour. Bad behaviour could be due to malicious behaviour,
but could also be due to network outages, system fail-
ures, mis-configuration, and software defects. Permission-
less Blockchains rely on crypto-economic enforcement, such
as charging transaction fees, to discourage bad behaviour,
whereas Permissioned Blockchains use external enforcement
such as taking legal action in a court of law.
IV. TECHNIQUES
A. Hashed Timelock Contracts
Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLC) [14] have been put
forward as a mechanism for trust-less inter-chain value transfer
and payment channel value transfer. This technique allows
value on one blockchain to be swapped for value on another
blockchain. For example in Fig. 7, Alice wishes to swap ten
Ether on Blockchain B for one Ether on Blockchain A.
Alice deploys a Smart Contract to affect the value swap
on the two blockchains. She sets-up the deal in the Smart
Contracts reflecting the offer. She deposits ten Blockchain
B Ether into the contract on Blockchain B. She generates
a random number R1 and calculates a commitment value H1
using Equation 1. She submits the commitment value H1 to
both contracts. She also submits a time-out either in number
of blocks or as wall clock time.
H1 = MessageDigest(R1) (1)
Anyone may now accept the offer. In Fig. 8, Bob accepts the
offer. Bob deposits one Ether on Blockchain A. He generates
a random number R2 and calculates a commitment value H2
using Equ. 2. He submits the commitment value H2 to both
contracts.
H2 = MessageDigest(R2) (2)
As soon as Bob submits the commitment values H2, both
Alice’s and Bob’s Ether is locked in the contracts in escrow.
To withdraw funds, Alice and Bob need to submit the random
values R1 and R2, as shown in Fig. 9. That is, Alice can
withdraw the one Ether on Blockchain A if the Smart Contract
on Blockchain A contains H1, H2, R1 and R2, and equations
Fig. 8. Hash Time Lock Contract Accept Offer.
Fig. 9. Hash Time Lock Contract Finalization.
Equ. 1 and Equ. 2 hold for the values. Similarly, Bob can
withdraw the ten Ether on Blockchain B if the Smart Contract
on Blockchain B contains H1, H2, R1 and R2, and equations
Equ. 1 and Equ. 2 hold for the values.
Alice and Bob can withdraw the Ether they have deposited
if the time-out expires and the correct random values R1 and
R2 have not been submitted to the contract they deposited
their Ether into. If the time-out is specified in blocks, one
should consider that different blockchains generate blocks with
different block periods. Even if the target block period on
the two blockchains is the same, the time-out on the two
blockchains can not be precisely the same as block generation
is not synchronised across blockchains. As such, blocks which
reflect the time-out block number on each blockchain will be
produced at different times.
If the blockchains both support the ability of checking
wall clock time, then wall clock time could be used. For
blockchains that support wall clock time, the time is likely
to be the time at which the block containing the transaction
accessing the time value was generated. In Ethereum, the node
mining the block chooses the block’s timestamp. Other nodes
in the network will accept the block, as long as the block
timestamp is within fifteen seconds of the current time. As
such, miners in Ethereum and other similar blockchains have
some limited influence as to which block a Hash Timelock
Contract expires in.
The system can be subject to misuse. Bob could submit his
random value, R2 to both contracts. Alice could wait until the
block is about to be generated which would expire the time-out
on Blockchain A. She could submit her value R1 and withdraw
the Ether on Blockchain A. Bob may not have time to fetch
the value R1 and submit it to the contract on Blockchain B.
In this case Alice could withdraw her Ether on Blockchain B
as the timeout would have expired and her Ether would no
longer be held in escrow.
5The system could be enhanced such that Alice has a longer
time-out to withdraw funds on Blockchain A and Bob has a
longer time-out on Blockchain B. For example, the Alice could
have a time-out of five minutes on Blockchain B and a one
hour on Blockchain A, whereas Bob could have a time-out
of five minutes on Blockchain A and a one hour time-out on
Blockchain B. In this scenario, if Alice submitted her value R1
to the contract on Blockchain A so that she could withdraw
her funds just before the five minute time-out, Bob would
have an additional fifty-five minutes to submit the R1 value to
Blockchain B to withdraw his funds.
Hash Timelock Contracts have the safety issue that parties
can loose their funds if they go offline for longer that the time-
out period prior to withdrawing their funds and after submit-
ting their secret. Another abuse of the system (though not a
safety issue) is that a party could only execute the agreement,
submitting their R value if blockchain value fluctuations are
in their favour [15]. That is, Alice could choose to not submit
R1 if the relative value of Ether on Blockchain A relative
to Blockchain B drops and submit it if the relative value
increases.
Hash Timelock Contracts do not suffer from liveness issues.
If funds are not transferred prior to the time-out, then the
participants are able to withdraw the funds. Even in the case
of the safety issue described above, where a participant goes
offline, the contract is not blocked from use once the time-out
has expired.
As Hash Timelock Contracts allow trust-less transfer of
value between blockchains, they are suitable for Permission-
less Blockchains and Permissioned Blockchains. They form
the basis of the value transfer mechanism in Poon and Dryja’s
Bitcoin Lightning Network [16], Thomas and Schwartz’s In-
terledger Protocol [17], and the Dogecoin to Ethereum bridge
[18].
B. Transferring Block Headers
Block Headers transferred between blockchains can be used
to verify that a transaction has executed on one blockchain and
that some action should occur on another blockchain based
on this fact. For example in Fig. 10 Alice observes blocks
being produced on Blockchain A. For each block produced
on Blockchain A, she submits the block header to Blockchain
B by submitting a transaction to a contract. Anyone, in this
example Bob in Fig. 11, can then submit a transaction to
the contract on Blockchain B that includes the block number,
the transaction which is said to have occurred on Blockchain
A, and a Merkle Proof (see Info. IV-B) that proves that the
transaction occurred on Blockchain A in a certain block. The
contract calculates the hash of the transaction said to have
occurred on Blockchain A, and calculates the Root Hash using
the partial Merkle Tree. If the Root Hash matches the value
in the block header indicated by the block number, then the
transaction will be deemed to have occurred on Blockchain A
in the specified block.
The safety of the system relies on the block headers being
transferred such that they can be trusted. The liveness of
the system depends on the block headers actually being
A Merkle Tree [19] is a tree of message digests, as shown in
the figure below. Each node in the tree is a message digest
value. Data D000 to D111 are separately message digested
to produce H000 to H111. Nodes above the leaf layer are
calculated as the message digest of the concatenation of the
nodes that feed into them. For example, H00 is calculated
as message digest(H000 + H001), where + indicates
concatenation. The node at the head of the tree is known as
the Root Hash or Merkle Root. Systems using Merkle Trees
typically have Root Hashes available such that verifiers can
confirm information in the Merkle Tree using the Merkle Root.
Merkle Proofs provide the ability to prove that a data
value is part of a dataset, without having the present the
entire dataset. For example, to prove that data value D110 is
a member of the dataset, the data value along with message
digests H111, H10, and H0 are presented to a verifier. The
verifier calculates candidate values for H110, H11, H1 and
the Root Hash. The verifier can confirm the data value is
part of the dataset if the candidate Root Hash matches the
expected Root Hash value. The data value along with the
message digests H111, H10, and H0 are known as a Merkle
Proof.
Information 1: Merkle Trees and Merkle Proofs
Fig. 10. Block Header Transfer
transferred. If the entity(ies) transferring block headers stop
transferring them, then no transactions can be confirmed on
the second blockchain.
BTC Relay [20] uses the block header transferring technique
described above to allow users of Ethereum MainNet (the
production public deployment of Ethereum) to confirm Bitcoin
transactions and do actions based on those transactions. A
typical action is to move Ether from one account to another
account based on a Bitcoin transaction transferring BTC from
one account to another account. Entities called Relayers are
6Fig. 11. Transaction Transfer
compensated for posting Bitcoin block headers to a Smart
Contract on Ethereum MainNet. BTC Relay relies on Proof of
Work (PoW) mining difficulty for its security. Multiple active
Relay nodes must be prepared to post the block header for each
block. In this way, if one Relay node posts a block header of a
fork of the chain, other Relay nodes can post the block header
of the longest chain. Transactions can only be validated if the
block header they relate to is on the longest chain and if at
least six block headers have been posted on top of the block
header that the transaction relates to [21]. As attackers can not
produce a longer chain than the main Bitcoin blockchain due
to the mining difficulty, they are unable to confirm transactions
based on a malicious fork.
Users of BTC Relay pay a fee to confirm Bitcoin transac-
tions on Ethereum. This fee is used to compensate Relayers.
However, if no users are confirming transactions on BTC
Relay, then Relayers are not compensated for submitting
blocks to the BTC Relay contract on Ethereum. This means
that the Relayers are not incentivised to submit Bitcoin block
headers. If no block headers are submitted, then transactions
can not be confirmed. This liveness issue has occurred in the
production deployments of BTC Relay as Relayers are no
longer relaying block headers.
A detailed security analysis of BTC Relay was conducted
in 2016 by Martin Swende [22]. This analysis identified
implementation issues such as being able to avoid fees while
confirming Bitcoin transactions, but no safety issues relating
to crosschain consensus.
Pegged Sidechains [23] proposes Bitcoins be transferred
between the Bitcoin blockchain and sidechains, to allow for
increased transaction rate and experimentation. The solution
relies on publishing a Merkle Proof that a transaction to trans-
fer Bitcoin was included in a block in the source blockchain
and publishing the block headers that were produced based
on that block, in the destination blockchain. The authors of
the paper [23] recommend users should consider providing 24
hours of block headers. If the hashing power of the source
blockchain is significant, then it would be impossible for an
attacker to produce forged blocks. Wood [24] contends that the
sidechain hashing power is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure
security. Consequently, Bitcoins can be securely transferred
to the sidechain from the Bitcoin blockchain, but not back.
As such, this methodology should be viewed as having safety
issues. Given the user affecting the transfer submits their own
block headers, there is no requirement to wait for or incentivise
relaying nodes to transfer block headers as there was in BTC
Relay. As such, this methodology does not suffer from liveness
issues.
BTC Relay and Pegged Sidechains are not generally appli-
cable as they rely on the source blockchain using PoW consen-
sus algorithm, and the hashing power of the source blockchain
being large enough such that attackers can not create forks
and affect transfers based on the forks. Additionally, PoW is
not an appropriate consensus algorithm for private blockchains
as organisations do not wish to allocate resources to mining
of blocks [10]. As such, they are inappropriate for Private
Blockchains.
The Clearmatics Ion project uses the block header trans-
ferring technique in the context of Private Permissioned
Blockchains. It provides a framework and tools to develop
crosschain smart contracts so that they execute if a state
transition has occurred on another blockchain [25], [26]. The
system works by having a set of validators that wish to transfer
block headers from one blockchain to another. At least a
threshold number of the validators need to sign each block
header for the block headers to be accepted by the receiving
blockchain. Validators only transfer a block header once the
blocks they relate to are deemed to be final (see Info. IV-B).
For the scenario when the source blockchain is Ethereum, a
user executes a transaction on the source blockchain that emits
an event. The transaction’s receipt contains the transaction
hash, the block number, transaction number, and includes a
list of event information. The event information is feeds into
the transaction hash calculation. The user can now execute
a transaction on the destination blockchain, passing in as
parameters information relating to the source blockchain’s
transaction: the block number, the Merkle Proof showing the
transaction belongs to the block, and the event information.
The code on the destination blockchain executes code that
verifies the source blockchain’s transaction information. If
that information is found to be correct, then code can use
the information in the event to perform some action. Ion
would suffer from liveness issues if not enough validators sign
block headers or if the multiply signed block headers are not
transferred to the destination blockchain.
BTC Relay and Pegged Sidechains leverage the consensus
protocol of the source blockchain, Bitcoin’s PoW, and rules
around how many blocks to wait, to provide crosschain
consensus. Ion forms crosschain consensus by registering
a set of validators from a source blockchain on a desti-
nation blockchain and requiring a threshold subset of the
validators to sign block headers for them to be accepted.
The threshold and the validators themselves do not need
to be related to the source blockchain’s consensus protocol.
Whereas the crosschain consensus algorithm for BTC Relay
and Pegged Sidechains is tied to the underlying blockchain,
Ion’s crosschain consensus algorithm is independent of the
source blockchain’s consensus algorithm.
C. Cosmos: Relay Chain with Block Header Transfer
Cosmos [29] is a multi-blockchain system in which
blockchains called Zones communicate transactions via a
central blockchain called a Hub, as shown in Fig. 12. The
7A block is final if it has been added to a blockchain and can
not be removed for any reason. A transaction that is included
in a block is final if the block it is included in is itself final.
Consensus algorithms such as Istanbul Fault Tolerant
(IBFT)[27] have immediate finality. In these protocols a block
can not be removed once it has been added to the blockchain.
Bitcoin and Ethereum’s Proof of Work (PoW) consensus
algorithms offer probabalistic finality. In these protocols
competing mining nodes may build longer (in the case of
Bitcoin) or heavier (in the case of Ethereum) chains, thus
causing a fork in the blockchain. If a fork occurs, blocks
that no longer belong to the canonical chain are known
as stale and the transactions in them are pushed back into
the transaction pool to be added to new blocks if they do
not already appear in blocks in the new canonical chain.
Due to mining difficulty, the probability of a node finding a
heavier chain and a block currently on the canonical chain
being discarded decreases as more blocks are added to the
blockchain[28].
Information 2: Finality
Fig. 12. Cosmos system of blockchains
Zones and the Hub typically use Tendermint [30] a type
of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance [31][32] consensus
algorithm. The system is envisaged to allow heterogeneous
blockchain communications, allowing the Zone blockchains to
be permissioned or permissionless, to use alternative consen-
sus algorithms, including algorithms that offer probabilistic
finality, and allowing for completely different blockchain
paradigms.
Validators on each Zone blockchain must have a set of val-
idators. The Zone blockchain validators must trust validators
in the Hub blockchain and visa-versa.
Fig. 13 shows an example communication of a datagram
Fig. 13. Cosmos Inter-Blockchain Communications (IBC)
from Zone 1 to Zone 3 using Cosmos’ Inter-Blockchain
Communications (IBC) system. A transaction on the Zone
1 blockchain generates the datagram to be communicated
to Zone 3 blockchain. The datagram is included in a block
on Zone 1 blockchain. A Block Commit message containing
the block header of the block containing the datagram to be
communicated is signed by at least a threshold number of
validators and sent to the Hub blockchain. A Packet message
containing the datagram, and a Merkle Proof proving that the
datagram relates to the block, are sent to the Hub blockchain.
The Hub blockchain then includes the datagram in a block
on the Hub blockchain. A node on the Hub blockchain then
sends a Block Commit message to the Zone 3 blockchain with
the Hub blockchain’s block header for the block containing
the datagram. This message is signed by at least a threshold
number of validators on the Hub blockchain. Finally, the Hub
blockchain sends the datagram along with a Merkle Proof in
a Packet message. The validators on Zone 3 blockchain can
send a Block Commit message and then an acknowledgement
message back to the Hub blockchain. Once the Hub blockchain
includes the acknowledgement in a block, validators on Zone
1 blockchain can check the acknowledgement and be sure that
the transaction has been included in the Zone 3 blockchain.
The datagram sent from the Zone 1 blockchain can contain
a time-out defined in terms of a block number on the Hub
blockchain. If the Hub blockchain determines that a datagram
has timed-out, because validators on the Hub blockchain have
not seen an acknowledgement from Zone 3 blockchain, they
can generate a time-out datagram, include it in the Hub
blockchain, send a Block Commit and then a Time-out message
to the Zone 1 blockchain.
Cosmos’ crosschain consensus relies on the trust between
the Zone and Hub blockchains, and the threshold number of
validators that need to sign a message used for each of them.
The messages contained in the Block Commit messages are
trusted based on this. In turn, datagrams are shown to have
been included in blocks by presenting Merkle Proofs in Packet
messages.
The system does not provide guaranteed atomic behaviour.
For example, there is no guarantee that a datagram is included
8in both the Zone 1 and Zone 3 blockchains. There is also
no guarantee that the Zone 3 blockchain will be willing to
submit acknowledgements to the Hub blockchain. The Hub
blockchain should produce a time-out datagram, though there
is no certainty that this will occur.
The liveness of the system depends on the liveness of the
individual Zone and Hub blockchains.
The Hub blockchain is provided rate control and protected
against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks flooding the system
with crosschain transactions by charging for each transaction
committed to the Hub blockchain using Cosmos’ digital cur-
rency, the Atom. This usage of the Atom could lead to issues
for users who do not have adequate Atoms to pay for blocks to
be included in the Hub blockchain. In particular, acknowledge-
ments posted by blockchains receiving crosschain transactions
may not be able to be posted to the Hub blockchain if accounts
on the receiving blockchain do not have adequate Atoms.
The system relies on Zone blockchain validators fully
trusting Hub blockchain validators to act correctly. That is,
the Hub blockchain acts as a centralisation point for the entire
system of blockchains.
Cosmos [29] documentation indicates that cross-zone mes-
sages can be end-to-end encrypted which would provide con-
fidentiality. This might allow the cross-zone message system
to be used between two Private Blockchain Zones.
D. Polkdot: Shared Consensus
Polkadot [24], [33] proposes a multi-chain network built on
Substrate consisting of Relay Chains, Parachains and Bridges.
Relay Chains provide shared consensus for all Parachains.
Parachains receive and process transactions. Bridges provide
a mechanism for transactions to be routed to non-Polkadot
blockchain systems. Note that, despite the name, Relay Chains
do not relay messages between Parachains or Bridges.
There are two main roles that participants play in the
Polkadot ecosystem: Collator and Validator. Collators collect
transactions on Parachains, propose blocks and provide zero
knowledge non-interactive proofs proving the transactions
result in valid state changes to the Validators. Groups of
Validators ratify Parachain blocks and publish them to the
Parachain. The Validators seal the Parachain block headers
to the Relay Chain. The Validators are randomly assigned to
Parachains, with the assignment changing regularly. Validators
use a Proof of Stake consensus algorithm to provide a shared
consensus for all Parachains. Supportive roles are performed
by Nominators and Fishermen. Nominators provide funds to
Validators they trust to execute the Proof of Stake consensus.
Fishermen observe the Parachains and submit fraud proofs to
Validators.
Cross-Parachain transactions are identical to typical transac-
tions from external accounts. A transaction on one Parachain
results in a message being placed in an outbound queue by
a Collator on that chain. A Collator for the target Parachain
will gather messages destined for the Parachain and submit
them to the Parachain’s incoming queue. The message is then
processed as a transaction on the destination Parachain. The
messages are trusted by the destination Parachain as the proof
that the message relates to a transaction on the originating
Parachain can be submitted, and the transaction can be proven
to have been included in a block.
Transactions from Polkadot to Ethereum via a Bridge
are achieved by submitting transactions to a special multi-
signature Ethereum contract. The signers of the multi-sig
wallet are likely to be Validators. Transactions from Ethereum
to Polkadot are achieved by calling into a special Ethereum
contract which writes an event to the Ethereum event log. This
event is interpreted as the outward bound call. As of January
2020, this technology is not documented, marked as alpha,
and appears to be abandoned.
Despite Polkadot appearing to be a multi-blockchain system,
the system is in reality a multi-shard system with shared
consensus. As such, for Cross-Parachain transactions, there
is no cross blockchain consensus. That is, there is no need
for one blockchain to prove to another blockchain that an
event occurred or a transaction has been included in a block,
as all nodes in the network are using the same blockchain.
This usage of a shared consensus algorithm greatly simplifies
Cross-Parachain communications.
If a Parachain was to be considered a separate chain,
then the requirement for randomly allocated Validators to
view information on the Parachain is incompatible with the
concepts of Private Blockchains which need to restrict the list
of participants.
1) Plasma and Exits: Minimum Viable Plasma [34]
builds on the concept of Plasma’s [35] delegate Ethereum
blockchains. Plasma chain operators create a Plasma Smart
Contract on Ethereum MainNet and hold value deposited in
the contract on a separate Plasma chain as Unspent Transaction
Output (UTXO) [36] values in a binary Merkle tree ordered
by transaction index. Transactions on the Plasma chain involve
proving that an unspent output had not previously been spent.
Plasma Cash [37], builds on the Minimum Viable Plasma
approach to allow for the exchange of non-fungible assets.
Each token has an identifier that represents the token’s location
in a sparse Merkle Tree. To spend a block, a proof needs to
be submitted showing when the token has been used.
For each Plasma variant, information is created on the
Plasma chain by a chain operators after a deposit into the
Plasma Smart Contract on Ethereum MainNet. To exit the
Plasma chain, the owner of a token needs to submit a proof to
the Plasma Smart Contract, proving that they own the token.
Another user could challenge the exit by submitting a fraud
proof showing that a subsequent transaction occurred that
changed the ownership of the token after the proof submitted
by the user purporting to by token owner. The challenge period
is typically at least seven days.
A drawback of Plasma is that users need to observe the
Plasma Smart Contract continuously, checking for fraudulent
exit proofs being submitted, to prevent tokens they rightfully
own being converted into Ether. If a user is offline for the
entire challenge period, then a nefarious actor could still their
tokens. The proofs are likely to be large. As such, exiting and
challenging an exit on Ethereum MainNet could be costly.
Another major issue is that Ethereum MainNet does not have
sufficient capacity to allow for a mass exit scenario, in which
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all members of a Plasma chain choose to exit the chain at the
same time.
From a crosschain consensus perspective, consensus is
provided by users submitting exit proofs and fraud proofs.
Plasma does not provide safety as nefarious actors could steal
a users tokens if a user is offline during a challenge period
or if the nefarious actor could orchestrate a mass exit, thus
preventing users from submitting fraud proofs.
E. Atomic Crosschain Transactions: Nested Transactions with
Coordination Blockchains and Threshold Signatures
Atomic Crosschain Transactions [1] for Ethereum Private
Sidechains [11] and private Ethereum blockchains allow for
inter-contract and inter-blockchain function calls that are both
synchronous and atomic.
1) Nested Transactions: Atomic Crosschain Transactions
are special nested Ethereum transactions and views. Transac-
tions are function calls that update state. Views are function
calls that return a value but do not update state. Fig. 14
shows an Externally Owned Account (EOA) calling a func-
tion funcA in contract ConA on blockchain Private
Blockchain A. This function in turn calls function funcB,
that in turn calls functions funcC and funcD, each on
separate blockchains. The transaction submitted by the EOA
is called the Originating Transaction. The transactions that
the Originating Transaction causes to be submitted are called
Subordinate Transactions. Subordinate Views may also be
triggered. In Fig. 14, a Subordinate View is used to call
funcC. This function returns a value to funcB.
Fig. 15 shows the nested structure of the Atomic Cross-
chain Transaction. The EOA user first creates the signed
Subordinate View for Private Blockchain C, contract
ConC, function funcC and the signed Subordinate Transac-
tion for Private Blockchain D, contract ConD, func-
tion funcD. They then create the signed Subordinate Trans-
action for Private Blockchain B, contract ConB, func-
tion funcB, and include the signed Subordinate Transac-
tion and View. Finally, they sign the Originating Transaction
for Private Blockchain A, contract ConA, function
funcA, including the signed Subordinate Transactions and
View.
2) Actual and Expected Parameter Values: When a func-
tion executes in the Ethereum Virtual Machine [38] function
Fig. 15. Nested Transactions and Views
Fig. 16. Function Calls across Blockchains
parameter values and stored state combine to form the actual
values of variables during execution. For example, consider
funcB in contract ConB on Private Blockchain B in
Fig. 16. Assuming _param1 is 1, state1 is 2, state2
is 4, and that funcC returns the value 6, then function
funcC will be called with the parameter value 1, and function
funcD will be called with the parameter value 10. To execute
this as part of a Crosschain Transaction, signed Subordinate
Transactions and View need to be created with the appropriate
parameter values.
Execution of a transaction or view fails if the actual
parameter value passed to a function does not match the
value in the signed Subordinate Transaction or View. The
parameter value in the signed Subordinate Transaction or View
is the value the application developer expected to be passed
to the function. The expected value can be determined at
time of nested transaction creation using dynamic program
analysis techniques. In particular, the dynamic analysis needs
to consider program flow. For instance, if state1 was 1, then
funcD would not be called, and no Subordinate Transaction
should be included in the Crosschain Transaction for this
function call.
3) Per-Node Transaction Processing: When the EOA sub-
mits the Originating Transaction to a node, the node processes
the transaction using the algorithm shown in Listing 1. If
the transaction includes any Subordinate Views, they are
dispatched and their results are cached (Lines 1 to 3). The
function is then executed (Lines 4 to 17). If a Subordinate
Transaction function call is encountered, the node checks that
the parameter values passed to the Subordinate Transaction
function call match the parameter values in the signed Subordi-
nate Transaction (Lines 6 to 8). If a Subordinate View function
call is encountered, the node checks that the parameters passed
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BLS Threshold Signatures [39], [40] combines the ideas of
threshold cryptography [41] with Boneh-Lynn-Shacham(BLS)
signatures [42], and uses a Pedersen commitment scheme [43]
to ensure verifiable secret sharing. The scheme allows any M
validator nodes of the total N validator nodes on a blockchain
to sign messages in a distributed way such that the private
key shares do not need to be assembled to create a signature.
Each validator node creates a signature share by signing the
message using their private key share. Any M of the total N
signature shares can be combined to create a valid signature.
Importantly, the signature contains no information about which
nodes signed, or what the threshold number of signatures (M)
needed to create the signature is.
Information 3: BLS Threshold Signatures
to the Subordinate View function call match the parameter
values in the signed Subordinate View (Lines 9 and 10). The
cached values of the results of the Subordinate View function
calls are then returned to the executing code (Line 11). If
the execution has completed without error, then each of the
signed Subordinate Transactions is submitted to a node on the
appropriate blockchain (Nodes 18 to 20).
Listing 1. Originating or Subordinate Transaction Processing
1 For All Subordinate Views {
2 Dispatch Subordinate Views & cache results
3 }
4 Trial Execution of Function Call {
5 While Executing Code {
6 If Subordinate Transaction function called {
7 check expected & actual parameters match.
8 }
9 Else If Subordinate View function is called {
10 check expected & actual parameters match
11 return cached results to code
12 }
13 Else {
14 Execute Code As Usual
15 }
16 }
17 }
18 For All Subordinate Transactions {
19 Submit Subordinate Transactions
20 }
4) Blockchain Signing and Threshold Signatures: The
Atomic Crosschain Transaction system uses BLS Threshold
Signatures (see Info. IV-E4) to prove that information came
from a specific blockchain. For example, in Fig. 14, nodes
on Private Blockchain B can be certain of results
returned by a node on Private Blockchain C for the
function call to funcC, as the results are threshold signed
by the validator nodes on Private Blockchain C. Sim-
ilarly, validator nodes on Private Blockchain A can
be certain that validator nodes on Private Blockchain
B have mined the Subordinate Transaction, locked contract
ConB and are holding the updated state as a provisional update
because validator nodes sign a Subordinate Transaction Ready
message indicating that the Subordinate Transaction is ready
to be committed.
5) Multichain Nodes: A Multichain Node is a logical
grouping of one or more blockchain validator nodes, where
each node is on a different blockchain. The blockchain nodes
Fig. 17. Multichain Nodes
operate together to allow Crosschain Transactions. The Mul-
tichain Node on which the transaction is submitted must
have Validator Nodes on all of the blockchains on which
the Originating Transaction and Subordinate Transactions and
Views take place.
Fig. 17 shows four enterprises that have validator nodes on
Private Blockchain A to Private Blockchain
D. Alice who works in Enterprise 1 can submit Atomic
Crosschain Transactions that span Private Blockchain
A to Private Blockchain D as Enterprise 1 has a Mul-
tichain Node that includes validator nodes on each blockchain.
However, Bob who works in Enterprise 4 can only sub-
mit Atomic Crosschain Transactions that span Private
Blockchain B and Private Blockchain C as Enter-
prise 4 only has validator nodes on Private Blockchain
B and Private Blockchain C.
6) Crosschain Coordination: Crosschain Coordination
Contracts exist on Coordination Blockchains. They allow
validator nodes to determine whether the provisional state
updates related to the Originating Transaction and Subordinate
Transactions should be committed or discarded. The contract is
also used to determine a common time-out for all blockchains,
and as a repository of Blockchain Public Keys.
When a user creates a Crosschain Transaction, they specify
the Coordination Blockchain and Crosschain Coordination
Contract to be used for the transaction, and the time-out for
the transaction in terms of a block number on the Coordi-
nation Blockchain. The validator node that they submit the
Originating Transaction to (the Originating Node) works with
other validator nodes on the blockchain to sign a Crosschain
Transaction Start message. This message is submitted to the
Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes
on all blockchains that the Crosschain Transaction has com-
menced.
When the Originating Node has received Subordinate Trans-
action Ready messages for all Subordinate Transactions, it
11
Fig. 18. Contract Locking States
works with other validator nodes to create a Crosschain Trans-
action Commit message. This message is submitted to the
Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes on
all blockchains that the Crosschain Transaction has completed
and all provisional updates should be committed. If an error
is detected, then a Crosschain Transaction Ignore message is
created and submitted to the Crosschain Coordination Contract
to indicate to all nodes on all blockchains that the Crosschain
Transaction has failed and all provisional updates should be
discarded. Similarly, if the transaction times-out, all provi-
sional updates will be discarded.
7) Contract Locking and Provisional State Updates: When
a contract is first deployed it is marked as a Lockable Contract
or a Nonlockable Contract. A Nonlockable Contract, the
default, is one which can not be locked. When a node attempts
to update the state of a contract given an Originating or
Subordinate Transaction, it checks whether the contract is
Lockable and whether it is locked. The transaction fails if the
contract is Nonlockable or if the contract is Lockable but is
locked.
Careful design is needed to determine whether a contract
should be Lockable or Nonlockable. Typically, an individual
item, for instance a hotel room, might be modelled as a
Lockable contract. The hotel contract would hold references
to each hotel room contract and be NonLockable. In this way,
many Atomic Crosschain Transaction can occur via the hotel
contract, without encountering locked hotel room contracts.
Figure 18 shows the locking state transitions for a contract.
The Crosschain Coordination Contract will be in Started state.
The act of mining an Originating Transaction or Subordinate
Transaction and including it in a blockchain locks the contract.
The contract is unlocked when the Crosschain Coordination
Contract is in the Committed or Ignored state, or when
the block number on the Coordination Blockchain is greater
than the Transaction Timeout Block Number. The Crosschain
Coordination Contract will change from the Started state to the
Committed state when a valid Crosschain Transaction Commit
message is submitted to it, and it will change from the Started
state to the Ignored state when a valid Crosschain Transaction
Ignore message is submitted to it.
Ordinarily, all nodes will receive a message indicating that
they should check the Crosschain Coordination Contract when
the contract can be unlocked. When a node first processes
a transaction, it will set a local timer which should expire
when the Transaction Timeout Block Number is exceeded. If
the node has not received the message by the time the local
timer expires, the node checks the Crosschain Coordination
Contract to see if the Transaction Timeout Block Number has
Fig. 19. Sequence Diagram
been exceeded and whether the updates should be committed
or ignored.
8) Sequence Diagram: Fig. 19 shows a sequence diagram
showing an example sequence of execution, based on the calls
in Fig. 14. The sequence starts with an Externally Owned
Account (EOA) submitting a Crosschain Transaction to a
node on Blockchain A. This nested transaction contains the
Originating Transaction, and all Subordinate Transactions and
Views, plus a time-out in terms of Coordination Blockchain
block numbers. The node is known as the Coordinating Node
for this transaction.
The nodes on Blockchain A cooperate to threshold sign
the Start message. The signed Start message is submitted
to the Coordination Contract on the Coordination Blockchain
specified in the Originating Transaction (and all Subordinate
Transactions and Views). The Coordination Contract on the
Coordination Blockchain accepts the Start message if its
signature can be verified with the public key registered for
Blockchain A. The Start message contains the time-out block
number, which the Coordinating Contract registers when it
accepts the Start message. Once the Start is registered, the
Crosschain Transaction is in Start state.
The Coordinating Node then Trial Executes the Originat-
ing Transaction. Assuming the code executes correctly, the
Subordinate Transaction for Blockchain B is dispatched. The
Originating Transaction is then submitted to Blockchain A’s
transaction pool. When the transaction is included in a block,
the contract’s updated state is stored as provisional state, and
the contract state is locked.
The Subordinate Transaction for Blockchain B contains a
Subordinate View for Blockchain C. The Subordinate View
is dispatched to a node on Blockchain C. The node on
Blockchain C completes a Trial Execution of the Subordinate
View at a certain block number. The node then cooperates with
other Blockchain C nodes to have the result of the Subordinate
View at the specific block number threshold signed. The node
returns the signed result to the calling node on Blockchain B.
The nodes on Blockchain B that do not contain the correct
version of Blockchain C’s public key fetch it from the Co-
ordination Contract. The node Trial Executes the Subordinate
Transaction, returning the value from the Subordinate View
to the code when the function corresponding to the Subordi-
nate View is called. Assuming the Trial Execution executes
correctly, then the Subordinate Transaction to be executed
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on Blockchain D is dispatched to a node on Blockchain D.
The Subordinate Transaction for Blockchain B is submitted to
Blockchain B’s transaction pool, with the signed Subordinate
View result from Blockchain C attached. When the transaction
is included in a block, the contract’s updated state is stored as
provisional state, and the contract state is locked. The nodes
on Blockchain B then cooperate to threshold sign a Ready
message, indicating that the blockchain is ready to commit
the Atomic Crosschain Transaction. The message is submitted
to the Coordinating Node.
The Subordinate Transaction for Blockchain D is trial
executed. There are no Subordinate Transactions or Views for
the transaction that need to be dispatched. The transaction is
mined. When the transaction has been included in a block,
the updated state is stored in provisional state, the contract is
locked, and the nodes on Blockchain D cooperate to threshold
sign a Ready message, indicating that the blockchain is ready
to commit the Atomic Crosschain Transaction. The message
is submitted to the Coordinating Node.
When the Coordinating Node (on Blockchain A) has re-
ceived Ready messages for Blockchain B and D, and the
Originating Transaction has been mined, then the nodes on
Blockchain A then cooperate to threshold sign a Commit mes-
sage. This message is uploaded to the Coordination Contract
on the Coordination Blockchain. Assuming this message is
uploaded prior to the time-out, the Crosschain Transaction is
then in the commit state.
The Coordinating Node requests nodes on other
Blockchains commit a Signalling Transaction. When a
node on a blockchain encounters a Signalling Transaction for
a certain Crosschain Transaction, it checks the Coordination
Contract for the Crosschain Transaction to check to see if the
transaction should be committed or ignored. If the transaction
is to be committed, then all contract provisional state related
to the transaction is converted to normal state, unlocking
the contracts. If the transaction is to be ignored, then the
contract provisional state is discarded and the contract state
is updated, unlocking the contracts.
9) Failure Cases: If an error is detected then nodes on
Blockchain A can cooperate to create a threshold signed Ignore
message which is uploaded to the Coordination Contract to
indicate to all nodes that the Crosschain Transaction should be
abandoned, all provisional state updates should be discarded
and contracts should be unlocked. If an Ignore message can
not be created, or if the Crosschain Transaction times-out, then
the state returned by the Coordination Contract indicates the
Crosschain Transaction should be abandoned.
When nodes on each blockchain first become a part of
a Crosschain Transaction, they set a timer to expire when
they expect the Crosschain Transaction to time-out, plus a
random additional wait period. The timer is cancelled when
a Signalling Transaction is received. If a node’s timer expires
prior to receiving a Signalling Transaction, the node checks
the Coordination Contract and then creates and submits a
Signalling Transaction to indicate to other nodes that the
updates should be committed or ignored, and that the contract
should be unlocked. The additional random wait period is used
so that all nodes on the blockchain do not simultaneously send
Signalling Transactions.
10) Analysis: Atomic Crosschain Transactions require a
set of validators to threshold sign information. The threshold
signing mechanism does not reveal any information about the
validators who signed or the threshold number of validators
that was needed to sign.
The identity of the node that submits the Start, Commit, and
Ignore messages is exposed when the messages are submitted
to the Crosschain Coordination Contract. This exposure could
be mitigated by using a new randomly generated identity for
each submission to the contract. The Crosschain Coordination
Contract trusts the messages based on the threshold signatures,
and not on the transaction signature.
Due to the simple fail-if-locked locking scheme, the system
can not have dead locks, though could suffer from live lock.
Due to the global per-transaction time-out offered by the
Coordination Blockchain, the system will not have liveness is-
sues. Once a Crosschain Transaction is committed, ignored, or
times-out, all contracts are unlocked. If nodes on a blockchain
refused to process a Signalling Transaction, then contracts
that were part of the crosschain transaction on the blockchain
would remain locked. However, this situation is analogous to
nodes refusing to produce any more blocks, and hence not
related to crosschain consensus.
The system does not allow for partial updates. Errors are
returned if a user attempts to read values from a locked
contract. As such, this methodology is a safe crosschain
consensus mechanism.
F. State Pinning
As per Sec. II-D and Sec. II-E, State Pinning and Final
State Pinning techniques aims to lock the overall state of one
blockchain to another blockchain.
1) Merge Mining: Merge Mining [44][45][46] is a tech-
nique in which the Block Hash of a low hashing power
public blockchain, such as NameCoin, is included in a more
secure higher hashing power blockchain, such as Bitcoin. In
this scenario, the Bitcoin miners must validate NameCoin
transactions prior to including the Block Hash in a transaction
on the Bitcoin network. The mined transaction can then be
included in both the Bitcoin and NameCoin blockchain.
Merged Mining relies on both blockchains using the same
consensus algorithm, and assumes that all transactions can
be viewed by both blockchains. As such, this technique is
not usable in a private blockchain scenario where transactions
must not be revealed outside the blockchain.
The liveness of a Merge Mined blockchain relies on the
miners being sufficiently incentivised to include blocks from
the Merge Mined blockchain in the higher hashing power
blockchain. The safety of the technique relies on a variety
of miners on higher hashing power blockchain choosing to
include blocks. For example, as of 2015, NameCoin has only
been mined by one miner [44].
2) Block Hash Posting: The Kaledio team developed Teth-
ered Permissioned Private Chains [47][9] to reduce the risk of
state reversion occurring by posting the state of the blockchain
onto Ethereum MainNet. In Kaleido’s system, a trusted entity
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Fig. 20. Anonymous Pinning Map
may be used to submit a block hash on behalf of blockchain
participants, thus keeping the participants secret.
The rate of transactions on the consortium chain is revealed
on Ethereum MainNet due to the number of posted Pins.
Additionally, the solution lacks a method of contesting a Pin
posted to Ethereum MainNet.
3) Anonymous Block Hash Posting: Robinson and Brainard
proposed Anonymous State Pinning [8] as a method of post-
ing block hashes of a private blockchain to a Management
blockchain without revealing the identities of participants
of the private blockchain or the rate of transactions, while
allowing posted block hashes to be contested. Pins (block
hashes) are posted to certain entries in a map as shown in
Fig. 20.
The value of the MapKey value is calculated using equation
Equ. 3, where KECCAK is a message digest algorithm, Private
Blockchain Identifier (PBI) identifies the blockchain, Pint-1
is the previous Pin value, PRF is a pseudo random function
which is seeded with a Private Blockchain Secret.
MapKeyt = KECCAK-256(PBI, P int-1, PRF (t)) (3)
Participants of a private blockchain observe the pinning map at
the MapKeyt address corresponding to the next Pin, waiting for
the next Pin to be posted to that entry in the map. When the Pin
value is posted, they check that the posted Pin matches their
understanding of the most recent Block Hash of the private
blockchain. If the values do not match, then participants should
contest the Pin. To contest the Pin, Pint, which is at MapKeyt,
they submit to the contract: MapKeyt-1, PRF(t), and the PBI.
Submitting the previous value of the MapKey, MapKeyt-1,
allows the contract to fetch from its own storage the value of
the previous Pin, Pint-1. The contract can then calculate the
MapKey of the contested Pin, MapKeyt, by combining Pint-1,
PRF(t) and the PBI using Equation 3. Given the submitter
of the transaction knows the PRF(t) which combined with the
PBI links the previous MapKey, MapKeyt-1, and the calculated
MapKey, MapKeyt, it implies that both of the MapKeys
correspond to Pins for the private blockchain denoted by
PBI. The further implication of knowing PRF(t) is that the
transaction submitter has access to the Private Blockchain
Secret, which implies that they are a member of the private
blockchain.
To hide the identity of participants, masked participants are
represented by a salted hash or their account number. masked
participants may unmask themselves at any time to become
unmasked participants by presenting their secret salt value.
Only unmasked participants can vote on whether a contested
Pin is valid.
As multiple blockchains can use the same map, it is difficult
for observers to determine the rate of pinning for a particular
blockchain, assuming one account is used to submit transac-
tions for multiple blockchains.
The liveness of the system depends on Pins being posted
when needed. The safety of the system depends on all partici-
pants being able to observe the management chain at all times
so that they can contest Pins when needed. This requirement
of being online all the time presents is an onerous requirement
which may not be able to be fulfilled in all deployments.
4) BLS Signed Block Hash Posting: The validators of a
blockchain could collaborate to use BLS Threshold Signatures
(see Info. IV-E4) to threshold sign block hashes that are
submitted to a management blockchain. In this scheme, the
public key related to the private key shares would be stored
on the management blockchain. The signed Pins are verified
when they are submitted to the contract used to store the Pins,
thus ensuring only valid Pins signed by a majority of validators
are accepted.
The advantage of this technique over the Anonymous Block
Hash Posting is that validators do not need to monitor the
management blockchain as only valid Pins are accepted. A
disadvantage of this technique is that it is more computation-
ally expensive both on the private blockchain side, having
to threshold sign the Pin, and in the smart contract on the
management blockchain, where a BLS signature needs to be
verified.
V. SUMMARY
The table below summarises the approaches to crosschain
consensus discussed in this chapter. The table shows the
scenarios and type of blockchain each technique is suitable for,
plus provides a short summary of how the technique provides
cross-blockchain consensus.
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